This paper reviews recent approaches to modeling the labour market, and assesses their implications for in ‡ation dynamics through both their e¤ect on marginal cost and on price-setting behavior. In a search and matching environment, we consider the following modeling setups: right-to-manage bargaining vs. e¢ cient bargaining, wage stickiness in new and existing matches, interactions at the …rm level between price and wage-setting, alternative forms of hiring frictions, search on-the-job and endogenous job separation. We …nd that most speci…cations imply too little real rigidity and, so, too volatile in ‡ation. Models with wage stickiness and right-to-manage bargaining, with …rm-speci…c labour and/or endogenous separation emerge as the most promising candidates. JEL Classi…cation System: E31,E32,E24,J64
Introduction and motivation
The key task of central banks is to maintain price stability by controlling in ‡ation and, for this reason, it is important to understand what drives the dynamics of in ‡ation. A crucial element of this is the underlying nature of nominal and real frictions associated with the adjustments of prices in the economy. A long tradition in monetary economics, starting with Phillips (1958) , has assigned labour market frictions and, in particular wage-setting frictions, a central role in in ‡ation dynamics. This paper analyses and compares existing labour market modeling approaches within the New Keynesian business cycle model setup. In particular, it explains their implications for the behaviour of marginal cost and in ‡ation in theory and quantitatively using a common calibration based on euro-area data. The paper highlights which of the particular features of each modeling approach are key for driving in ‡ation dynamics and provides a structure to the rich variety of modeling approaches in the existing literature. 1 We follow an active strand of research that has set out to model the labour market more explicitly within the New Keynesian business cycle model, most often opting for including variants of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model of search and matching frictions. The rationale for so doing comes from the belief that sluggish responses in labour market variables to shocks are a natural place to look for the origins of the sluggish response of in ‡ation to shocks. In terms of the New Keynesian framework, labour market frictions will alter either aggregate marginal cost or the …rms'price-setting behaviour for given marginal cost. 2 However, so far, the implications for in ‡ation dynamics seem to be mixed. Some have, for example, argued that accounting for equilibrium unemployment increases the resilience of marginal cost, and hence in ‡ation, to shocks by adding a pool of slack resources; see, e.g., Trigari (2005) and Walsh (2005) . Others, e.g., Krause and Lubik (2007) , conclude that contrary to received wisdom wage rigidity does not impact on in ‡ation inertia. 3 As a starting point, we choose the e¢ cient bargaining version of Trigari (2006) : that is, a plain New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and a distinction between heads and hours. Building on this, we replace certain assumptions on the labour market structure by others, one at a time. We consider the following vari-ants: right-to-manage (instead of e¢ cient) bargaining (Trigari (2006) ), stickiness of wages in these setups (Gertler and Trigari (2006) and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005) ) di¤erentiating between stickiness in new matches and existing matches (Bodart et al. (2005) and Bodart et al. (2006) ), interactions at the …rm-level between price and wage-setting (Kuester (2007) , Sveen and Weinke (2007) and Thomas (2008) ), alternative forms of vacancy posting costs (Yashiv (2006) ) and the hiring process (Fujita and Ramey (2005) ), search on-the-job (Krause and Lubik (2006) and van Zandweghe (2006)) and endogenous separation (den Haan et al. (2000) and Zanetti (2007) ). In each of the cases we provide intuition for the e¤ect that a speci…c modi…cation of the baseline model has on in ‡ation dynamics. Our …ndings are as follows. We show, …rst, that the baseline model predicts a response of in ‡ation that is too large relative to the data, as a result of the large and immediate response of real marginal cost. This would suggest either that the labour market is not an important source of real rigidities or that the speci…c way of modeling the labour market does not capture the way the labour market a¤ects in ‡ation dynamics in practice. We follow the second route. When combined with a 'right-to-manage' assumption for the determination of hours, staggered wages at the level of the match help to smooth the reaction of the marginal wage resulting in a smaller response to shocks of marginal cost and in ‡ation. In ‡ation responds even less to shocks when we account for the …rm-speci…c nature of labour in the search and matching model. Doing so, however, also has implications for the responses of unemployment and vacancies that take these further away from the data. Variations of the hiring costs empirically only have a small impact on in ‡ation dynamics. In contrast, we …nd that endogenous separation is a promising candidate for reducing the response of in ‡ation to shocks, though this …nding depends critically on the calibration, as is the case for many of the examples. More generally, by analysing a wide range of institutional features of the labour market employing a variety of variants of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching model, we show that only those institutional features that a¤ect or generate a direct channel from wages to in ‡ation matter for in ‡ation dynamics. By contrast, institutional features that leave this channel una¤ected matter much less for in ‡ation dynamics. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the baseline model. We highlight which are the features of the model that will be changed subsequently. In section 3, we calibrate the baseline model to euro area data. Subsequently, we compare the responses of in ‡ation (and wages and unemployment) to a monetary policy shock in the model with the responses to the same shock in euro area data. In section 4 we consider the e¤ects of having 'right-to-manage' bargaining and section 5 adds nominal wage rigidities for new and existing jobs, exploring how these rigidities interact with the bargaining scheme. Section 6 considers what happens if wages and prices are set simultaneously in the presence of …rm-speci…c labour. Section 7 allows for new hires being productive immediately and not only with a one-period delay. In section 8 we discuss the e¤ects of varying the free-entry condition and vacancy costs. Sections 9 and 10 consider other margins along which adjustment can occur in the labour market: section 9 discussing on-the-job search and section 10 discussing endogenous job destruction. Section 11 concludes. An Appendix, as a point of reference, presents empirical evidence on monetary transmission in the euro area.
The baseline model
In this section we lay out our baseline model, a simpli…ed version of Trigari's (2006) e¢ cient bargaining model.
Households, consumption and saving
We assume that there is a continuum of workers indexed by j on the unit interval who supply a homogeneous type of labour. Only a proportion n t of them are employed. We adopt a representative -or large -household interpretation so that the unemployment rate u t = 1 n t is identical at the household or at the aggregate level. As shown by Merz (1995) , the representative household assumption amounts to allowing for the existence of state contingent securities o¤ering workers insurance against di¤erences in their speci…c labour income. Household members (workers) share their labour income, ie, wage and unemployment bene…ts, before choosing per capita consumption and bond holdings. Labour income is made of the sum of hourly wages, w t , weighted by total hours worked, n t h t , and unemployment bene…ts, b, weighted by the number of unemployed, 1 n t . 4 As shareholders, households also receive the pro…ts t generated by the monopolistic competitive retail …rms and the intermediate producers of labour services. We assume separability between leisure and consumption in the instantaneous utility function, implying that all workers share the same marginal utility of wealth and choose the same optimal consumption, be they employed or not. A worker's utility can be written as
with c 1; > 0; 0. Let H t (j) be the value function of worker j. If we momentarily leave aside the labour supply decision, which is taken by the household as a whole, worker j's maximisation program is
where workers hold their …nancial wealth in the form of one-period bonds, B t , with price 1=r t (where r t is the nominal interest rate), c t represents aggregate consumption, t t are lump-sum taxes payable and p t is the consumer price index. The worker's optimal consumption and saving decision coincide with those of his peers and are derived from the following …rst order conditions:
Firms
In our baseline model, the economy consists of three sectors: a perfectly-competitive …-nal good sector, a monopolistically-competitive retail sector and a perfectly-competitive intermediate good sector.
Final goods sector
We assume a continuum of di¤erentiated goods indexed by i on the unit interval. Final good …rms aggregate the di¤erentiated goods y r t (i) produced by the retailers into a homogeneous consumption good using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology
where 1= p represents the retailers'gross price mark-up while 1=(1 p ) is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate di¤erentiated goods. Each …nal good …rm maximises pro…t, leading to the following demand for intermediate good i
where p t is the …nal good price, obtained by aggregation of the retailers prices
The modeling of the …nal good sector will remain …xed throughout the paper.
Monopolistic retailers and price setting
Given the demand y r t (i) retail …rm i faces for its product, it buys a homogeneous intermediate labour good at nominal price p t x t per unit and transforms it one for one into a di¤erentiated product. In each period, a fraction 1 p of retail …rms sets a new price p t (i). This price prevails j periods later with probability j p . The pricesetting …rms maximise the discounted ‡ows of expected real pro…ts using a discount rate consistent with that used by their shareholders (ie, households). All the pricesetting …rms face the same optimisation problem, implying that they all choose the same new price p t . Pro…t maximisation results in the following …rst-order condition
Log-linearising the resulting expression around the steady state enables us to derive the New Keynesian Phillips Curvê
where t = p t =p t 1 is the in ‡ation rate while 'hats'denote percentage deviations from steady state. This expression makes clear that, for a given response of in ‡ation to movements in real marginal cost -which will depend on p -the response of in ‡ation to a given shock will depend on how real marginal cost,x t , responds to that shock.
Intermediate goods sector
In the baseline model, there are a continuum of intermediate labour good producers uniformly distributed and selling their output in a competitive market. Their only factor of production is labour, and labour e¢ ciency is decreasing with hours, so that h hours supplied by one worker produce only h units of e¢ cient labour, < 1. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), we assume that intermediate producers can hire at most one worker so that their production is either zero or
where o indicates match o. In the baseline the intermediate goods sector and the retailers are linked through competitive markets for the intermediate good. In section 6, we assess the implications for in ‡ation dynamics once these two sectors are merged so that there are interactions between wage and price setting at the level of the individual …rm.
The labour market
The labour market is organised such that it links the intermediate good …rms and the workers.
Labour market ‡ows
Let m t denote the number of new …rm-worker matches. We assume that the number of matches is a function of the number of job vacancies v t and e¤ective job seekers u t , and we consider the following linear homogeneous matching function:
with m > 0 and # 2 (0; 1). 5 In the baseline, the probability an unemployed worker …nds a job is given by
while the probability that a …rm …lls a vacancy is given by
An exogenous proportion of …rm-worker relationships ends each period, which implies the following employment dynamics:
In the baseline therefore employment is predetermined, while hours per worker are free to adjust contemporaneously. This means that marginal costs are in the …rst period after a shock in ‡uenced exclusively by the marginal cost of an additional hour worked on the intensive margin. We ease this assumption in section 7, where we allow for contemporaneous hiring, and in section 10, which looks at endogenous separation.
Value of a job and of a vacancy for an intermediate labour-services producer
Firms and workers bargain over wages; such bargaining distributes the rents that arise once a match is formed to both the …rm and the worker. We denote by J t and V t , respectively, the asset value of a job and of a vacancy at period t, dropping match index i for convenience:
where k v t represents the per-period hiring cost (in units of the consumption good).
Value of a job and value of unemployment for a household
For a worker's family, which bargains on his behalf, the value of a new job is given by
where U t represents the present value of being unemployed at period t. Formally,
Wage bargaining
In this section, we discuss the bargaining over wages and hours between workers and …rms once a match has been formed. We will focus here on a bargaining scheme that is e¢ cient, ie, in which hours and wages are bargained over simultaneously and the bargained wage maximises the joint surplus of the …rm and the worker. 6 The outcome of the bargaining process is obtained by maximisation of the Nash product:
The …rst term of the Nash product is the surplus a worker obtains from a job, raised to the worker's relative bargaining power 2 (0; 1). The second term is the …rm surplus, raised to the …rm's relative bargaining power 1 . Under e¢ cient bargaining, the …rst-order conditions can be shown to simplify to
This shows that the wage paid in any individual matches is not allocative for hours, that is @h t =@w t = 0. Note that x t , the price of the intermedaite goods, coincides with the marginal cost for price-setting …rms. Rearranging the above equation
highlights the implications of e¢ cient bargaining for marginal costs (and in ‡ation).
Real marginal cost will equal the worker's marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (mrs t ) divided by the real marginal product of labour (mpl t ).
Both of these will, in turn, depend on hours worked per employee. E¢ ciency requires that the marginal gain to the …rm of an additional hour worked (the …rm's marginal value product of labour, x t mpl t ) is the same as the marginal cost to the worker of that hour (his marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, mrs t ). This makes clear that this subjective price of work determines the marginal wage, the marginal cost of producing intermediate goods and the marginal cost of producing differentiated goods, while the average wage rate, w t , will be unrelated to that marginal wage and, so, to real marginal cost. This bargaining procedure is said to be 'e¢ cient' because it results in hours that maximise the joint surplus of the match, that is J t + W t U t V t . The …rst-order condition for the wage bargaining simpli…es to
which states that each of the contracting parties receives a share of the total surplus proportional to its relative bargaining power.
Vacancy posting
In order to …nd a worker, and so in order to produce, labour …rms have to post a vacancy …rst. In the baseline we follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Merz (1995) , and assume a constant, per period, cost of opening up a vacancy, k v t = . 7 Free entry in the market for vacancies implies that in equilibrium the value of a vacancy is V t = 0 in every period t and the equation for the asset value of a vacancy (15) can be recast as:
where total vacancy costs are given by v t , and the average cost per hiring is =q t . Using this, the value of a job for a …rm simpli…es to
From equations (22) and (23), one easily obtains the dynamic representation of the average cost per hire
which determines job creation in the model.
Monetary policy, …scal policy and market clearing
Throughout the paper we assume that monetary policy is conducted according to the following Taylor ruler
with r 0 and > 1 and m t is an i.i.d. interest rate shock. Lump-sum taxes, t t ; are set so as to balance the budget period by period and there is no autonomous government spending. Finally, equilibrium in the …nal goods market implies
3 Stylised facts and the baseline economy
The aim of this paper is to elicit the role of speci…c labour market frictions for the behaviour of marginal cost and in ‡ation. In order to obtain a measure of the empirical relevance of the respective approaches, we compare the responses to a monetary policy easing in the respective model variant to stylised facts for the euro area.
Calibration of the model economies
In order to put all variants on the same footing, the calibration is harmonised as much as possible. The time-discount factor, , is chosen to match an average annual real rate of 3.3%. We set to 10, implying an elasticity of substitution for labour of 0.1, in line withbut at the lower end of -microeconomic studies for the euro area. 9 The value of the risk aversion coe¢ cient is set to c = 1:5, following Smets and Wouters (2003) . Turning to the labour good sector and the labour market, we set = 0:99, so there are almost constant-returns to hours per employee. 10 On monthly data ranging to the early 1990s, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate an elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment of # = 0:7 for France, Germany and Spain. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey estimates of the matching function for European countries and for the United States and conclude that a range from # = 0:5 to # = 0:7 is admissible. We select the midpoint, setting # = 0:6. The bargaining power of workers is set to a conventional value: = 0:5. For the variants of the model we consider later that involve wage stickiness, we follow the recent evidence of du Caju et al. (2008) , which reports average wage contract durations for various euro area countries of between one and three years. Where applicable, we therefore set the degree of nominal wage rigidity to w = 0:83; which implies an average wage duration of 6 quarters. In the price-setting sector, we calibrate the markup to a conventional value of 10%, so p = 1=1:1 (in the Dixit-Stiglitz setup this implies a price-elasticity of demand of = 11). For the average contract duration of prices we use the results of Alvarez et al. (2005) and set the corresponding Calvo parameter to p = 0:75, which amounts to an average price duration of 4 quarters. As is conventional, we set the response of monetary policy to in ‡ation to = 1:5 and allow for interest rate smoothing by setting R = 0:85. Given these parameters, we set the other parameters of our models to ensure that the steady state values for certain endogenous variables coincided across the di¤erent setups. The target values for these variables, shown in Table 2 , equals 65%, in line with the net replacement rates published by the OECD in its set of 'Bene…ts and Wages' data. Finally, the evidence collected in and Hobijn and Sahin (2007) points to quarterly separation rates, from a worker ‡ow perspective, of = 6%.
Stylised facts -the transmission of monetary policy
In response to a monetary shock that causes interest rates to fall by 100 basis points in annualised terms, empirical evidence from the literature and our own VAR (see Appendix) shows that in the euro area: Fact 5: most of the adjustment in labour is borne by the number of employees rather than by hours worked per employee. Some uncertainty surrounds this statement, though, as the data for hours worked in the euro area are of relatively poor quality.
E¤ects of a monetary policy shock in the baseline
As a …rst check against this evidence, Figure 1 reports the response of the economy to a monetary easing, where the impulse is an exogenous one percentage point reduction in the nominal interest rate. As can be seen in Figure 1 , in the baseline in ‡ation responds far too strongly to the monetary easing (by a factor of ten) while output e¤ects are of the appropriate size. The strong response of in ‡ation comes from the fact that real marginal costs for price setting …rms are largely determined by the cost of increasing hours worked by each worker. Under e¢ cient bargaining, the baseline case, these marginal costs are given by the marginal rate of substitution divided by the marginal product of labour,
. Given near constant returns to scale ( close to unity), the marginal product of labour , mpl t , will be little a¤ected. The percentage change in real marginal cost will therefore be driven by the response of the marginal rate of substitution, mrs t . This in turn depends on the percentage change in the marginal utility of consumption and, fundamentally, on the response of hours per worker, where the latter is ampli…ed times. Given our calibration, this implies a strong response of real marginal cost to an increase in hours worked and output. 13 The remainder of the paper alters features of the model that a¤ect the response of in ‡ation to shocks. We start by assessing a di¤erent bargaining scheme.
Right-to-manage bargaining
In this section, we consider an alternative process for bargaining over wages and hours. In particular, we follow Trigari (2006) and use a 'right-to-manage'assumption for the bargaining process. In this setup, the wage rate is agreed upon …rst and then the …rm chooses hours worked at that wage rate so as to maximise pro…ts. The …rst-order condition for labour demand is:
meaning that that the cost of the marginal hour is equal to its bene…ts, ie, that the hourly wage is equal to the marginal value product of an hour worked. The right-to- 13 While the average wage rate does not have a direct bearing on in ‡ation, there is an indirect e¤ect. Employment and unemployment are determined by the job creation condition, (24) . As illustrated in Figure 1 , in the baseline model the real wage response to the monetary policy shock is large. Trigari (2006) highlights that solving the Shimer (2005) puzzle in the benchmark model also helps to reduce the response of in ‡ation. If more of the labour adjustment needed to produce the additional output is provided through the extensive (number of employees) margin, the intensive (hours per employee) margin will also react less, which curbs the rise in the marginal rate of substitution and thus the rise in marginal costs. manage assumption radically modi…es the composition of real marginal cost. Under e¢ cient bargaining, real marginal cost depends on hours and the marginal utility of consumption. Under right-to-manage, the hourly wage becomes an essential element of real marginal cost, opening what Christo¤el et al. (2008) and Trigari (2006) , for example, term the 'wage channel'. Therefore, the response of marginal cost and in ‡ation to shocks will depend entirely upon the response of the bargained hourly wage to shocks. 14 This notwithstanding, the e¤ect of the right-to-manage assumption on marginal cost and in ‡ation in equilibrium is a priori unclear. The major di¤erence to the e¢ cient bargaining assumption is that the choice of hours depends directly on the average wage, and that @h t =@w t < 0. This a¤ects the wage bargaining. Wage equation (21) becomes
This means that the relative bargaining power of the workers in the wage negotiation is modi…ed by t : equations (28) and (29) suggest that the workers'bargaining power increases with hours worked. 15 The more inelastic the labour supply at the intensive margin (the larger is ), the stronger this e¤ect. If is large enough, the average wage will tend to be more responsive under right-to-manage than under e¢ cient bargaining because of the strong relative bargaining power e¤ect. It is less clear, however, whether this also implies that marginal costs are more responsive. Under right-to-manage, the marginal wage coincides with the average wage, w t , which is more responsive than the average wage would be under e¢ cient bargaining. Under e¢ cient bargaining however, the marginal wage, given by mrs t , is already more responsive than the average wage. Figure 1 about here Figure 1 compares the response of the economy to a monetary shock under both bargaining schemes. As the above logic suggests, the average hourly wage rate, w t ; responds more strongly (and in fact much too strongly in view of the stylised facts) to a monetary easing under right-to-manage. Still, the marginal wage rates (which determine the marginal cost of …rms) show a very similar movement under both bargaining schemes, as can be seen in the similar response of marginal cost under the two schemes, leaving the response of in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock essentially unchanged. 16 We conclude that the bargaining scheme in itself has little implication for in ‡ation dynamics. As the next section shows, however, di¤erent bargaining schemes can imply fundamentally di¤erent e¤ects of wage rigidity on in ‡ation dynamics.
Wage rigidity
A cornerstone of the canonical New Keynesian framework is that average wage rates and their stickiness are instrumental for in ‡ation dynamics, see, eg, Christiano et al. The role of wage stickiness for in ‡ation dynamics depends on the type of wage bargaining along which the economy is organised (e¢ cient vs. right-to-manage) as well as on whether wage stickiness a¤ects only existing matches or also new matches (and thus hiring incentives of …rms). We assume that in each period only a fraction (1- Even though the wage bargaining will be discussed in detail later, it is important at this stage to stress that all the '…rm-worker' pairs that are given the opportunity to (re)-negotiate their wage contract face the same problem and therefore set the same wage. Because wage negotiation is time-dependent, di¤erent workers may be paid di¤erent wages and can supply di¤erent hours, even though they are otherwise ex-ante identical.
E¢ cient bargaining
Under e¢ cient bargaining, as we showed earlier, real marginal cost will equal the workers'marginal rate of substitution divided by their marginal product and will be independent of the average wage rate in existing matches. 18 For that reason, wage rigidity, if it only a¤ects existing matches, does not have a bearing on in ‡ation dynamics if bargaining is e¢ cient. Matters change if wage stickiness a¤ects the wages of prospective new hires. As the vacancy posting condition equation makes clear, hiring incentives depend on the expected pro…ts of …rms. Wages are important in allocating the surplus of the match among …rms and workers. As Hall (2005) notes, wage stickiness in new matches enhances the cyclicality of job creation by altering the share of revenue left to …rms over the cycle. Since hiring incentives are a¤ected, future marginal costs and, thus, in ‡ation will be a¤ected as well. The reason is that the hiring behaviour of …rms in ‡uences the economy-wide relative use of the extensive margin and the intensive margin of employment and this will have a direct bearing on marginal costs, as a result of the decreasing returns to hours worked per employee, 1, and the increasing marginal disutility of work > 0. 19 Wage stickiness, insofar as it a¤ects new matches, makes hiring more responsive to a monetary easing. This means that the demanddriven increase in labour input is borne more by the number of employees rather than by hours worked. As a result, the average worker works fewer hours than in the absence of wage stickiness. This means that the marginal rate of substitution rises less strongly, and also that the marginal product of labour falls less strongly. So, wage stickiness for new hires, through its e¤ect on employment, makes marginal costs (and thus in ‡ation) less responsive to a monetary easing. Figure 2 about here Figure 2 illustrates the empirical implications of this. In the baseline setup, equation (13) implies that employment only reacts with a lag. With wage stickiness in new matches, employment reacts more strongly. This leads to a quicker fall in the response of hours, lowering the persistence of the responses of marginal cost and in ‡ation. While future marginal costs and in ‡ation thereby react less than in the absence of wage rigidity, quantitatively the di¤erences are tiny, as Figure 2 illustrates. Complementing 18 The reason is that in existing matches the average wage rate is not allocative but rather splits the surplus of the match among the two parties. In particular, even when …xing the average hourly wage rate, this does not …x the hourly wage rate schedule. As part of an e¢ cient bargaining agreement, the relevant section of marginal wages can be freely set in a state-contingent way even if average wage rates are …xed. 19 See also Trigari (2006) . Krause and Lubik (2008) …nd that wage stickiness is irrelevant for in ‡ation dynamics. This rests on their assumption that there is only an extensive margin, in which case marginal costs indeed are little a¤ected. the results in this section, Section 7 assesses the case when the baseline is modi…ed to allow for contemporaneous hiring, in which case employment is a jump variable and the initial response of hours worked per employee is thereby attenuated.
Right-to-manage bargaining
Section 4 highlighted that right-to-manage implies a close relationship between hours worked and the wage. In this section, we allow for stickiness in these wages. In particular, if the wage of a worker has been bargained i periods ago, he or she will work
hours. Here, we let w t i = w n; t i pt represent the real value of the nominal wage negotiated at time t i. w n; t i is the nominal wage rate negotiated i periods ago, which for some matches will continue to prevail today. The asset value of a job clearly depends on the bargained wage. Adopting the viewpoint of an intermediate producer, we denote by J t (w t j ) the asset value in period t of a job with a wage that was bargained i periods ago. Ex ante, the asset value of a new match for the …rm can be written as
where w t is the average real value of all hourly wages. The asset value of a vacant job V t is still given by equation (15), ie, the vacancy posting condition is not modi…ed. All the (re-)negotiating …rm-worker couples face the same problem and therefore choose the same wage w t through the usual Nash bargaining procedure
where the worker's surplus, W t (w t ) U t , takes into account the fact that wages may not be renegotiated immediately. After some algebra, we obtain the wage equation for wages negotiated at time t h t (w t )
Figure 3 about here Figure 3 shows the response to a monetary easing in the right-to-manage model with ‡exible wages (which are similar to the e¢ cient bargaining baseline) and the two alternatives with nominal wage rigidities. Two observations are in order. First and foremost, the combination of the right-to-manage bargaining with nominal wage stickiness produces much more rigid wages. These translate into a more reasonable response of in ‡ation, and into in ‡ation persistence. In other words, the combination of sticky wages with 'right-to-manage' bargaining is able to generate a magnitude of the response of in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock that is in line with the stylised facts. This follows directly from the fact that in right-to-manage bargaining, there is a direct cost channel from wages to marginal cost to in ‡ation. Second, the responses are very similar for the two cases of wage rigidity. Whether wage rigidity a¤ects only existing matches, or all matches, does not matter much for in ‡ation dynamics. 6 Real rigidities arising within the individual …rm
Following most of the existing literature, the baseline assumed that price-setting …rms can buy labour goods, y l t ; in a competitive factor market at cost x t per unit. They then transform this into a di¤erentiated product. Due to this assumption, price-setting …rms'marginal costs are independent of their own output level. In that setup only if aggregate marginal costs are more rigid will in ‡ation be more rigid. Following Kuester (2007) and Thomas (2008) . The presence of search and matching frictions in the labour market means that a worker in this economy temporarily constitutes a …rm-speci…c factor of production to the …rm at which he is employed. 20 This, in turn, means that a …rm's price-setting has an e¤ect not only on the demand that the …rm faces but also on the wage demand of its worker, and thus on the …rm's own marginal costs. As a consequence, for any given behaviour of aggregate marginal costs, …rms are induced to adjust prices by less. The mechanism at work is the following. Consider an aggregate shock that all else equal would imply an increase in the marginal cost of all …rms. A …rm that can re-optimise its price passes part of the cost increase on to consumers. The increase in its price causes a fall in demand. This fall in demand will be the stronger the more price-elastic is demand, ie, the larger is = . In turn hours worked at the …rm fall (they fall by more the more the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, ie, the smaller is ). So, in sum, hours worked fall the more in response to a price increase, the larger is and the smaller is . If workers have an increasing marginal disutility of work, ie, > 0, this fall in hours worked leads to a reduction in the worker's marginal disutility of work. Therefore, at the time of deciding on the price the …rm sets, it anticipates that the price increase would induce an e¤ect that balances the original increase in marginal costs: workers take part of the original cost increase on themselves by accepting lower marginal wage rates. This implies that price setting …rms decide to move their prices by less for any given behaviour of aggregate marginal costs than in the baseline model, curbing the response of in ‡ation to shocks relative to the benchmark model. 21 This intuition is captured in the New Keynesian Phillips curve for the modi…ed model economy:
With respect to the baseline New Keynesian Phillips curve, equation (9), there is an additional term dampening the pass-through of marginal cost on in ‡ation (underlined). As the above discussion suggested, the more price-elastic is demand (the larger is ), 20 In the intermediate labor sector of the baseline model, workers also constituted a temporarily …rmspeci…c production factor. By assumption, however, this sector operated under perfect competition and ‡exible prices. 21 It seems important to distinguish between real rigidities arising at the aggregate level and real rigidities arising at the individual …rm level. For real rigidities arising at the aggregate level, as in Ball and Romer (1990), prices (and thus in ‡ation) will respond the less to shocks the less (the aggregate component of) marginal cost responds to these shocks. For real rigidities arising at the individual …rm level, prices will respond the less to shocks the more (the …rm-speci…c component of) any …rm's marginal cost rises with demand. For a further exposition, see also Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) . the more curved the marginal disutility of labour is (the larger ) and the faster the returns to hours per employee decrease at the …rm level (the smaller ), the less will …rms adjust prices to aggregate shocks, and the weaker will therefore be the response of in ‡ation to its aggregate driving forces. As a result, in ‡ation reacts considerably less to the monetary shock when allowing for …rm-speci…c labour, bringing the response more in line with the stylised facts. In turn, this implies that the monetary easing provides more stimulus, which translates into a response of output that is larger than in the baseline.
Contemporaneous hiring
In the variants of the search model discussed above there was a one period lag before a worker hired in t takes on the job. In light of the empiricial evidence on short term ‡uc-tuations in employment, it is useful to look at a variant allowing for contemporaneous hiring. 22 This section follows Ravenna and Walsh (2007) and assumes the following timing. As before, at the beginning of each period some …rms and workers randomly separate. Firms that are not matched with a worker can post vacancies. Contrary to the case in previous sections however, the successful matches become productive in the same period. So employment evolves according to n t = (1 )n t 1 + m t . This timing assumption implies the following ‡ow values for the value of a job to the …rm and the value of a vacancy
The ‡ow value of being employed, W t , and the ‡ow value of being unemployed, U t , are de…ned with respect to the end of the period after the formation of the current period 22 Data for the U.S. shows that more than 60 % of unemployment spells take less than 14 weeks, see "Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey". For the Euro area the proportion of short term unemployed (up to a 2 month unemployment spell) in total employment was around 15 % in the period between 2005q1 and 2008q2, according to the OECD Labor Force Survey. Including also spells until 5 months implies a proportion of roughly 30 percent of short term unemployment in total unemployment. matches. Figure 5 shows the response to the monetary easing. The introduction of contemporaneous hiring has a direct impact on marginal costs. As matches become productive within the period labour adjustment moves from the intensive to the extensive margin. As a result the reaction of employment is considerably more pronounced and the reaction of hours per worker is lower than in the baseline. The peak response of unemployment occurs in the …rst period and exceeds the peak response in the baseline by a factor of two. The strong response of employment implies a lower reaction of hours and a slightly lower wage response. The overall impact on in ‡ation is small nevertheless. 
Employment adjustment costs convex in the hiring rate
In the …rst variant of the model, we drop the assumption of a …xed recurrent vacancy posting cost. Instead, we follow Gertler and Trigari (2006) and assume that total hiring costs are a quadratic function of the hiring rate. The idea is that hiring costs not only increase with the number of new hires, but also with the ratio of new hires to existing jobs,
where we assume that the total hiring cost is shared equally among all the …rms that posted a vacancy. Transforming (38) , the cost per hiring, k
, is proportional to the hiring rate mt nt . This is in contrast to the baseline where the cost per hire typically increases with n t due to the congestion e¤ect which is associated with the search and matching process. All else equal, this will lead to greater variation in employment and thus less variation in marginal costs and in ‡ation. Using the free entry condition V t = 0 and substituting for k v t , equations (22), (23) and (24) are left unmodi…ed but for the substitution of =q t by m t =n t , so that the dynamics of the job creation condition will be determined by the hiring rate instead of the probability of …lling a vacancy. Figure 6 about here Figure 6 shows that hiring reacts more strongly to shocks relative to the baseline and, so, future real marginal costs react less strongly, reducing the e¤ect of the shock on in ‡ation. Quantitatively, however, in our calibration the e¤ect is tiny.
Vacancy costs as sunk costs
An alternative to convex costs is a sunk cost as in Fujita and Ramey (2005) . In this case, …rms pay a sunk cost only once when they post a new vacancy. Every period, all the …rms that have neither a worker nor vacancy draw their sunk cost, K, out of a distribution, F (K) . Among these, all the …rms endowed with a sunk cost lower than
will post a vacancy. Denoting the newly posted vacancies by v n t , we obtain that
and the law of motion of vacancies is:
Let us assume that the cumulative distribution is a linear function of the sunk cost
where k 0 is the lowest sunk cost in the distribution while { is a slope parameter. Of course, the lower (respectively higher) is k (respectively {), the higher is the number of new vacancies and the more volatile is employment. Finally, total vacancy posting costs are given by:
Note that in this variant, no equation of the baseline model is modi…ed except for that governing vacancy posting costs. The corresponding wage equation is obtained by substituting (14), (16) and (17) into (21) and cannot be further simpli…ed. As illustrated by Figure 6 the addition of sunk costs clearly increases vacancy persistence (since vacancies are now a stock variable rather than a ‡ow variable) but, again, the quantitative e¤ects on the dynamic response of in ‡ation to the shock are weak.
9 On-the-job search
In the baseline only unemployed workers can search, with the result that only they enter the matching function and can be matched up with vacancies. But, in reality, currently-employed workers spend at least some of their time looking around for alternative job opportunities. The result of this is that job-to-job movements form a large part of all job destruction and creation and are, thus, potentially important for marginal costs over the cycle. 24 Following Krause and Lubik (2006) and van Zandweghe (2006), we assume that jobs come in two types: 'good'jobs (that pay higher wages) and 'bad'jobs (that pay lower wages). Aggregate output is produced using workers employed in both types of jobs. The presence of these two types of jobs creates an incentive for workers employed in bad jobs to search for good jobs. So, good …rms are able to recruit from a pool of workers that includes both those unemployed workers who are searching for good jobs, u g;t , and those currently employed in bad jobs, e t = t n b;t , where t is the search intensity of employed workers and n b;t is employment in the bad sector. Given this, the relevant measure of labour market tightness for the 'good'sector will be~ t = vt ug;t+et , where 24 Akerlof et al. (1988) and Gomes (2007) suggest that job-to-job ‡ows account for around 50% of all job separations in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. However, Contini and Revelli (1997) suggest that the proportion is smaller than this in euro area countries. u g;t is unemployment of good sector workers. This measure of market tightness will likely be less volatile than the measure in the baseline model without search on-the-job, which was given by t = vt ut . The reason is that job-to-job ‡ows, e t , will be procyclical. In a boom, more new vacancies will be posted than if there were no on-the-job search; since employment in the 'bad' sector is procyclical, the number of searching workers will also be procyclical, increasing the likelihood of …lling a vacancy in a boom relative to the model with no on-the-job search. The …rst-order condition for employed search intensity will be given by: where t is the cost of searching with intensity t . As can be seen, as more vacancies are posted, employed workers increase their search intensity, which will lower expected hiring costs and increase the incentive to post vacancies even further. That is, the rising search activity of the employed in a boom forms an additional resource in the matching function that helps to keep hiring costs more stable. The model predicts that job-to-job ‡ows rise in booms, in line with the data. In the model with on-the-job search (and in the baseline model), the New Keynesian Phillips Curve will continue to be given by (9) . Given that …nal output is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas function of output in each of the two sectors, real marginal cost will be given by:
where ! denotes the share of the output of 'bad'jobs in …nal output. With e¢ cient bargaining over hours, real marginal cost in each sector will again be equal to the marginal rate of substitution divided by the marginal product of labour in that sector:
and
So the response of real marginal cost to demand shocks will depend upon the response of hours in each sector to such shocks. On-the-job search leads to a reduced response in hiring costs in response to shocks; as this a¤ects the extensive margin, this will reduce the response of future real marginal cost to shocks and, thus presumably, the response of in ‡ation. Figure 7 about here Despite this, however, Figure 7 shows that even with on-the-job search, the response of in ‡ation is only slightly smaller than the in ‡ation response in the baseline model. In turn, this is because of the large and immediate 6% rise in real marginal cost in response to this shock, o¤set only slightly by the lower response of real marginal cost in future periods relative to the baseline.
Endogenous job destruction
In much of the literature on frictional labour markets job separation is treated as an exogenous process, for several reasons: it makes the model easier to solve; it makes the model easier to calibrate; and it implies a robust negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, whereas models that endogenise separation of have problems replicating the Beveridge curve. However, the separation rate rises in recessions. 25 Therefore, in this section we consider a version of the baseline model with endogenous separation. This imposes an additional …rst-order condition related to the separation margin and thus further restricts the model's predicted dynamics. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we endogenise separation by assuming that each match has an idiosyncratic productivity component that is uncorrelated with aggregate productivity. Thus, the income produced by a match is given by x t z it h it , where z it is the match-speci…c productivity component and the rest of the notation follows that in Section 2. We will assume z it is normally distributed with a cumulative distribution F , with mean 1 and standard deviation z . This distribution will allow us to nest the exogenous search model as a special case of our endogenous search model associated with z ! 0. 26 We will call the reservation productivity at which separation occurs
Following den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume that z it is iid. That is, z it is uncorrelated with the aggregate shock x t , it is uncorrelated across individual matches i, and most importantly it is uncorrelated over time. For continuity with the rest of the paper, we still include an exogenous separation component: at the end of each period, existing matches separate for exogenous reasons with probability x .
Allowing for productivity shocks with distribution F in all periods, and reservation productivity z t , the employment dynamics are:
The fraction of jobs surviving between periods t 1 and t is therefore 1
The total number of worker-…rm pairs that meet at the end
, where u t 1 = 1 n t 1 but the number that actually enter into production at the start of t is only (1 F (z t )) m t 1 . The rest of the model has the structure spelled out in Sections 2-3. In particular, we assume e¢ cient bargaining, as in Sec. 3.1, which now implies that both wages and hours will depend on the match-speci…c productivity shock z it . Thus in the analogue to equation (14), a matched …rm's value function is a function of the shock, J t (z it ), and its ‡ow of revenues is
A matched worker's value function W t (z it ) also depends on the shock; the worker's ‡ow payo¤s are
1+ . On the right-hand side of all the Bellman equations there will therefore be expectations of future values with respect to z it+1 . E¢ cient bargaining over hours gives a …rst-order condition which is equivalent to (20) , except that it also takes into account the idiosyncratic productivity shock:
Thus hours are proportional to z
1+
with the time-varying factor of proportionality H t , which will help us aggregate hours and wages. This allows us to integrate across productivity to express all quantities in aggregate terms. After some algebraic manipulation, the job creation Euler equation analogous to (24) becomes
The reservation productivity z t satis…es the job destruction equation J t (z t ) = 0. Eliminating the wage and expected future values from the Bellman equation for J, the job destruction equation can be written as
Calibrating this version of the model requires us to determine what fraction of separa-tions are endogenous. For the US, Davis and Haltiwanger (1995) roughly calculated the fraction of endogenous separations in US data by comparing …rm-level job destruction (which they argue should re ‡ect changes in …rms'labour demand, and therefore map into the model's endogenous component) with total worker separation ‡ows (which are larger, and should include worker-initiated changes in employment status which they map into the model's exogenous component). They …nd that the endogenous component is roughly 40% of the total, which -absent evidence for the euro area -is the number we will use here. Then for any standard deviation z of the idiosyncratic shock, we can calculate z = F 1 (0:4 0:06), assuming 6% total separation ‡ows as before, and from z we can calculate all the integrals over z that appear in the equations. Other parameters can be backed out as before: m can be deduced from observed job ‡ows, and can be chosen so that (46) is satis…ed. Finally, we can choose and b for consistency with the job creation and job destruction equations, (47) and (48) . For a given z , this makes the replacement ratio endogenous, so this calibration strategy will not automatically generate the same replacement rate used in previous sections of the paper. Therefore, we have simulated the model for a range of values z , looking for a parameterisation that implies the same replacement ratio assumed in the baseline model. When we set the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to z = 0:4, we obtain a 65% replacement ratio, as in the baseline model. Figure 8 about here For this parameterisation, Fig. 8 shows the impulse responses for endogenous separation together with those of the exogenous separation model that has the same replacement ratio (65%). The monetary stimulus primarily goes into wages. The overall stimulative e¤ect of the money shock is relatively small. 27 As the …gure shows, hours per worker and vacancies both rise, but separation and unemployment increase, too, for this calibration. While in ‡ation and most other aggregate variables behave similarly in the two cases, the introduction of endogenous separation thus leads to counterfactual implications for unemployment. We thus con…rm a previous …nding in the literature that even when endogenising separation has little impact on quantities outside of the labour market, it can be very hard to force all the margins of labour market adjustment to co-move realistically. 27 Interestingly, there are various parameter regions implying major qualitative changes in the impulse responses, including regions of indeterminacy. For example, setting z = 0:1, which leads to a replacement ratio of 84%, we …nd that a monetary stimulus causes a large fall in the separation rate. Under these parameters, unemployment is more volatile (and responds in the right direction) and wages and in ‡ation are much smoother. Thus, while the parameterisation with z = 0:4 fails to improve the model's in ‡ation predictions, the e¤ects of endogenous separation di¤er (and improve relative to the data) at z = 0:1. In this paper, we have assessed the ability of labour market variants in a New Keynesian model to explain in ‡ation dynamics using, as our empirical benchmark, the responses of variables to a monetary policy shock in the euro area. Our results are largely negative and are collected in Table 3 , below. We …rst used a standard New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and e¢ cient bargaining to show that such models typically generate a response of in ‡ation to nominal shocks that is much too large relative to the data. We then considered many, if not most, of the alternative speci…cations that currently exist in the literature.
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In ‡a-tion Table 3 : Peak responses to a 100 bps monetary easing in the models and in the data. Top: euro area data. Then: baseline model with e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and right-to-manage bargaining (RTM); models with EB and RTM and sticky wages for new and existing matches; real rigidities arising at the …rm-level due to …rm-speci…c labour; contemporaneous hiring instead of a one-period lag; di¤erent forms of hiring costs (period by period but convex in the hiring rate, or sunk); on-the-job search; and allowing for endogenous separation. Relative to the baseline, each of the models changes one feature at a time. From left to right: output, in ‡ation, unemployment, employment, real wages per employee, real wage per hour, total hours worked, hours per employee. All variables are expressed in log percentage deviation from steady state.
We …rst considered the addition of wage rigidity. Under e¢ cient bargaining, wage stickiness in existing jobs has no e¤ect since average wages in existing jobs are nonallocative. But, wage stickiness in newly-created jobs does have an e¤ect. In this case, the existing wage rate will a¤ect real marginal cost, since the wage paid to new hires a¤ects hiring incentives and, thus, marginal costs. Combined with a 'right-to-manage' assumption for the determination of hours (which implies a direct channel from wages to in ‡ation), staggered wages at the level of the match will help to smooth the reaction of the aggregate wage, resulting in a smaller response to shocks of marginal cost and in ‡ation. When we then combined this nominal rigidity with the real rigidity of …rm-speci…c labour, we found that prices respond less to shocks the more any individual …rm's marginal cost responds to a change in that …rm's price. Hence, the response of in ‡ation to nominal shocks is reduced if the marginal disutility of work is increasing in hours worked and/or there are decreasing returns to labour; both these conditions hold in our calibrated model. Given the central role of employment dynamics for marginal costs, we then looked at variants of the hiring cost function which have been proposed to imply stronger and more persistent employment ‡uctuations. We found that neither of the modi…cations we considered materially a¤ected the response of in ‡ation to nominal shocks. Finally, we considered two other margins along which adjustment can occur in the labour market: on-the-job search and endogenous job destruction. We found that both features could help reduce the response of in ‡ation to shocks. However, the e¤ects of endogenising job destruction depend critically on the calibration of the model, and some of the implications for other model variables were counterfactual. In summary, we found that a model with sticky nominal wages when combined with right-to-manage bargaining was best able to capture the response of in ‡ation to nominal shocks. Reassuringly, in that setup it was also largely irrelevant whether wage stickiness a¤ected only existing matches or also new matches. More generally, our results suggest that the extent to which the labour market matters for in ‡ation dynamics depends crucially on its microeconomic structure. For future work, it would therefore be interesting to test the mechanisms we have explored using microeconomic data. Work on wage stickiness for new hires that has recently been conducted, eg, by Haefke et al. (2007) is a …rst step in that direction. Microeconomic evidence on bargaining, and contractual arrangements regarding state contingency of the wage, overtime payments and premia, overtime accounts and nonwage components of compensation, would be a valuable further step towards assessing the relative merits of these di¤erent labour market setups.
12 Appendix: further evidence on monetary transmission in the euro area
In the paper, we benchmarked the di¤erent approaches to modelling the labour market against …ve stylised facts about the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. This section presents the background evidence from which we deduced these stylised facts. 28 Figure 9 prints the impulse responses of euro area aggregates to a 100 basis 28 A number of studies have examined the response of real and nominal variables in the euro area to a monetary shock using alternative identi…cation mechanisms. For early evidence on the euro area as a whole see, eg, Peersman and Smets (2003) this evidence, a monetary easing stimulates the economy. At its peak, output has risen by about 0.8% above steady state. In ‡ation increases, too, but in a muted manner. The peak increase in quarter-on-quarter GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation is about 25 basis points (in annualised terms). As a consequence of higher demand, the number of unemployed people, ie, unemployment, falls by 3%. 30 The increase in economic activity also translates into an increase in the real wage per employee. That increase is about half the size of the increase in output, but is highly persistent. 29 Their data comprise quarterly euro area aggregates and a number of euro-area country-speci…c series from 1987Q1 to 2005Q4, as well as foreign series. 30 The depicted fall in unemployment corresponds to a fall in the unemployment rate of about 0.27 percentage points. Unemployment is calculated in a model-consistent way from the response in employment, which McCallum and Smets report, by assuming that the labor force does not react to a monetary easing, and that average unemployment rates are 9%. 
Inflation rate
Figure 10: Impulse responses to an unanticipated monetary shock -own estimates. Underlying the results is a VAR(4) estimated on above data (taken from the AWM data set except four hours worked, which is taken from . The sample is 1987Q1 to 2006Q4, identi…cation relies on the usual Cholesky decomposition. The data was de-trended variable by variable prior to running the VAR. For real variables, we allow for a trend, and a break in the trend plus a level shift in 1991Q1 so as to accommodate German reuni…cation. In ‡ation and mominal interest rates were regressed on a linear trend, which breaks after 1998Q4 in order to account for the disin ‡ation in the euro area prior to the introduction of the common currency, and the constancy of the in ‡ation objective thereafter. Dotted lines mark asymptotic 90% con…dence intervals (5% and 95% bounds).
these estimates, an unanticipated monetary easing induces a longer-lived deviation of nominal rates from the baseline than in McCallum and Smets (2008) and, as a result, most responses are more persistent. With regard to amplitudes, the evidence is robust, however. A monetary easing of 100basis points causes a signi…cant increase in output of about 0.8% at its peak, and an increase in real wages per employee of about half that size (which is, again, highly persistent). Unemployment, according to our estimates, Figure 11 : Impulse responses of hours and wages to a monetary shockown estimates. Shown are the responses of employment, hours per employee and the real wage rate. The VAR is the same as in Figure 10 , except that the a measure of hours per worker and of the real hour wage rate replaces the measures for total hours worked and the real wage per employee. falls by 6%. 31 At the same time, the increase in in ‡ation remains contained, with GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation remaining below 0.4 percentage points in annualised terms. In the above estimation, we resort to the same proxy for hours worked in the euro area as used by . 32 When using this series to infer hourly wage rates and hours worked per employee, the results suggest that changes at the extensive margin are more relevant for labour adjustment than hours worked per employee. The …rst two panels of Figure 11 suggest that hours worked per employee react little throughout the period (and if anything, they fall), while the number of employees is more responsive. As a result, the increase in wages per employee depicted in Figure  10 is mainly attributed to a slow but persistent increase in hourly wages instead of an increase in hours per worker. (See Figure 11. ) Due to the limitations of the euro area data with respect to hours worked or hourly wages, however, the responses in Figure  11 -while indicative -should be taken with a relatively large grain of salt. Finally, Table 4 summarises the impulse responses reported above, and augments these with the evidence of three further studies. Angeloni et al. (2003) report impulse responses for the euro area based on various identi…cation schemes for the monetary shock in a VAR. So do Peersman and Smets (2003) . The table, in addition, collects evidence of a recent study by Peersman and Straub (2007) who identify a monetary shock (and other shocks) based on sign restrictions, which were derived from a prototypical New Keynesian model. The table summarises the maximum amplitudes of the variables following the monetary shock. Most of the studies imply that after the initial shock, nominal rates fall somewhat further before being tightened. In order to harmonise the studies, all responses have been normalised by the maximum easing of the nominal interest rate that these studies report.
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Empl Table 4 : Peak responses to a monetary easing in the literature. Most of the studies imply that after the initial easing, nominal rates fall somewhat further before they tighten. In order harmonize the studies, all responses have been normalized by the maximum easing of the nominal interest rate that these studies report (which in all studies occurs one quarter after the shock). Entries in small type refer to numbers that have been deduced indirectly as described below. 
